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M

ilitary missions must be accomplished within a political and legal environment. One often indistinct and elusive but nonetheless important dimension of that environment is comprised of the expectations held by politically

relevant actors (some of whom maybe far from the actual arena of operation) as to

what constitutes or will constitute, in the circumstances, lawful action. Expectations which approve or disap prove a projected mission can be significan t factors in

determining the quantum of resources required for mission accomplishment or,
indeed, in determining whether there will be a successful outcome. In some cases,
these considerations may require adjustments in the mission's design or even its
abandonment.
It isa truism that it is wise to consult your lawyers before you act, for they are expert
in identifying authoritative expectations. In international law, such consultations
do not always help, because expectations with res pect to the lawfulness of current
or projected actions in the contemporary internationa] politica] system are not
necessarily congruent with the stuff with which lawyers ordinarily work, the forma]
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texts of international law. For one thing, the jurymen of international law, the cast
of politically relevant actors, have expanded from a small group of nation-State
elites who produce those texts. l It now includes a wide range of non-governmental
actors, whose activities and influence are amplified by easy mobility and a global
network of communications. For another, the texts of international law which are
produced by nation-State elites vary in their effectiveness and the extent to which
they reflect or shape expectations; some of the texts, for all their legalistic language,
are only aspirational, while others are «law-in-the-books" rather than "law-in action." Still other texts are part ofthe "myth system" ofinternationallaw rather
than its "operational code."2
So although formal international legal texts can always be "crunched" in various
logical exercises to reach desired "legal" conclusions, those conclusions may prove
to be quite different from the expectations of lawfulness held by the actors whose
expectations of lawfulness are actually relevant for a particu1ar mission. Th us, the
international legal specialist who plays a role in the design of a military mission and
who appreciates the relevance of the legal variable as a factor in the mission faces
two daunting professional challenges: first, in identifying who are the politically
relevant actors in a specific context, and, second, in articulating and analyzing their
operative expectations of lawfulness. The key values held by important actors in
the institutions of, and outside of, contemporary international law can be critical
factors in the cost or feasibility of a particular military mission. In designing or appraising missions against AI Qaeda, the collective views of the UN Security Council, other governments and non-State entities form parts of the legal environment.
AI Qaeda's agents and franchisees often operate across political boundaries and
may be independent of or have only shadowy relations with governments or components within them, instead deriving their support from non-governmental
entities.
I believe that Afghanistan, the central focus of this workshop, provides an instructive example of my thesis. Because my purpose is to illustrate the relations between mission design and international legal and institutional environments, a
cursory review of the modern history of Afghanistan is necessary.
II

Afghanistan is divided along geographic and ethnic lines which do not configure its
political borders. Neither its demographic divisions nor its topography dispose it
to effective and centralized control or internal stab ility. Still Afghanistan enjoyed
an extended period of stab ility in the reign ofZahir Shah, from 1933 to 1973. That
tranquility ended when Zahir Shah was overthrown by his brother-in-law, who
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terminated the monarchy and established a republic with, mirabile dictu, himself as
its President. Five years later, he, in tum, was overthrown by the People's Demo·
cratic Party (PDPA). Nur Mohammed Taraki became President, the republic was
rechristened the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and closer relations with the
Soviet Union were forged . The Soviet Army intelVened in Afghanistan in 1979 and
installed Babrak Karmal in place ofTaraki. In terms of internaJ order, it was more
on the order of a personnel change than a regime change, as the political vocabulary and secular governmental program of Karmal's predecessor continued.
President Carter had begun to fund and train Mujahidin through Pakistan's secret selVice, the 151 (Inter-SelVices Intelligence agency), to fight the Soviet-backed
government} The policy was continued under President Reagan. The Mujahidin
were a largely religiously-inspired resistance. That said and without minimizing
the mobilizing potential of Jihadist Islam, any attempt to depict or comprehend
the war or Afghan politics, in general, in exclusively ideological, nationalistic or religious terms without accounting for ethnicity, language, region, the pursuit of
wealth or simple bare-knuckle power politics would oversimplify a dauntingly
complex political system.
The Soviet occupation and the Afghan resistance cost the lives of over one million and perhaps as many as two million Afghans; five million Afghans fled the
co u ntry.~ When the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, thesubtraction of the Soviet military from the Afghan equation did not produce the immediate collapse of the Najibullah government. The civil war continued. The factor that
ultimately brought Dr. Najibullah down appears to have been the Soviet decision
in 1992 to terminate the sale of petroleum to the Afghan government.
Even after the collapse of the Najibullah government, the civil war ground on,
with great loss of life; by then, much of the fighting was being carried on between
various Mujahidin factions, who broke along language, ethnic and regional lines.
Beginning in 1994, however, the Taliban, a fundamentalist Sunni and Pashtun
force based in the south, emerged as a more unified element. The Taliban seized
Kandahar and then Kabul in 1996 and by 2000 had captured 95 percent of the
country.s The erstwhile Democratic Republic of Afghanistan morphed into the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates recognized and maintained diplomatic relations with the Taliban as the legitimate government. Nor did
the Taliban fare better at the United Nations, where the General Assembly'sCredentials Committee refused to seat the Taliban government, despite its effective control
of the country. Instead, the Committee accredited the representatives of the ousted
government of President Rabbani, the leader of a Mujahidin faction, who was not renowned for his commitment to secular vaJues or to democracy.
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There is no indication that withholding certification at the United Nations had
any effect on the Taliban's control of the country. Indeed, it was only in its 200 1 report after "Operation Enduring Freedom"6 that the Credentials Committee took
note of the agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan which the Security Council had endorsed in Resolution 1383 (200 1).7 Thereupon, the Karzai government assumed the Afghan seat in the Assembly. Notwithstanding the potential
fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc, it seems safe to say that the General Assembly's
Credentials Committee was endorsing the regime change of Operation Enduring
Freedom.
Osama bin Laden's organization, AI Qaeda, had been born and nurtured on the
borders of Afghanistan during the war against the Soviet Union's occupation, but
AI Qaeda is not a political movement indigenous to Afghanistan. It was formed as
part of a pan-Islamic military effort to force the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.
After the victory in 1989, AI Qaeda expanded its goals and relocated to Sudan.
When AI Qaeda was subsequently expelled from Sudan as a result of US pressure,
Osama bin Laden returned to and began to operate fro m Afghanistan. He established training and operational bases and his operatives conducted significant actions, inter alia, against US installations and forces. Those latter actions appear to
have been the principal reason why the Security Council began taking a renewed
interest in Afghanistan. Let me turn to them briefly.
In the late 1990s, though the General Assembly had refused to seat the Taliban
government, Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed a special representative
who was charged with negotiating a political settlement. Meanwhile, the Security
Council sought to influence events in the Afghan civil war through various resolutions which reflected differe nt concerns. Security Council Resolution 1214 of December 8, 1998, for example, condemned many of the human rights violations of
the Taliban but the Council registered, in particular, that it was "deeply disturbed by
the continuing use of Afghan territory, especially areas controlled by the Taliban,
for the sheltering and training of terrorists and the planning of terrorist acts."6 In
paragraph 13, the Council demanded "that the Taliban stop providing sanctuary
and training for international terrorists and their organizations and that all Afghan
factions cooperate with efforts to bring indicted terrorists to justice. ''9
A year later, the Council's fOCllS on AI Qaeda became sharper. It
deplor[edl the fact that the Taliban contin ues to provide safe haven to Usama bin Laden
and to allow him and others associated with him to operate a network of te rrorist
training camps from Taliban-controUed territory and to use Afghanistan as a base
from which to sponsor international terrorist operations. 10
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In 2000, the Council reiterated this language and continued by "strongly condemning the continuing use of [Afghan territory, especially areas controlled by the
Talibanl, for the sheltering and training of terrorists and planning of terrorist acts
. . . . "11 The Council determined that the failure of the Taliban to respond to the de·
mands of paragmph 13 of Resolution 1214 and of pamgmph 2 of Resolution 1267
of the preceding years now "constitute[d l a threat to international peace and secu·
rity."12 Acting explicitly under Chapter VII, the Council essentially reiterated the
demands which had been made in previous resolutions but also demanded that
Osama bin Laden be surrendered either to the United States or to a country that
would turn him over to the United States. The Council also imposed an array of
economic sanctions in Resolution 1267, denying air access and freezing funds. A
year later, in Resolution 1333 (2000), the Council reiterated its demands. At the
end ofJuly 200 I , the Council ordered the Secretary·General to establish a monitor·
ing mechanism for the implementation of all of the previous resolutions.13
Together, these were the measures which the Security Council members were
able to agree to take during that period. None prescribed by its sequence of resolu·
tions appears to have had any effect on the Taliban's control and administmtion of
Afghanistan or AI Qaeda's freedom of operation within or beyond its borders.
Quite the contrary: only forty· three days after the last Council resolution, on September II , 200 I, AI Qaeda mounted its infamous attacks on civilian and military
targets in the United States.
The reaction of the Security Council on September 12, in Resolution 1368, is in·
teresting and worth quoting in full, for its content tells much about the decision dy·
namics of the Council, its capacity to respond effectively to such crises and, as a result,
its potential to facilitate-and restrain-such military actions as the United States con·
cluded were necessary for its defense. Resolution 1368 provides, in its entirety:
The Security Council,
Reaffirming the principles and pwposes of the Charter of the United Nations,
Determined to combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused
by terrorist acts,
Recognizing the inherent right of individual or coUective self-defence in accordance
with the Charter,
1. Unequivocally condemns in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks
which took place on II September 2001 in New York, Washington, D.C. and
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Pennsylvania and regards such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat
to international peace and security;
2. Expresses its deepest sympathy and condolences to the victims and their families
and to the people and Government of the United States of America;
3. Calls on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators,
organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stresses that those responsible
for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of
these acts will be hdd accountable;
4. Calls also on the international community to redouble their efforts to prevent
and suppress terrorist acts including by increased cooperation and full
implementation of the relevant international anti-terrorist conventions and Security
Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999;

5. Expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks
of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its
responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations;
6. Decides to remain seized of the matter. l4

You will note that the "combat by all means" statement in the second
considerandum and the "all necessary steps" in operative paragraph 5 refer to the
Security Council and not to any single State; the single State (obviously the United
States) is confined, in the third considerandum, to self-defense. But bycharacterizing, in the second considerandum, terrorist acts as "threats to the peace" rather
than "breaches of the peace" or "acts of aggression," the Resolution kept them
from falling under Article 51's right of self-defense. l) As for the operative paragraphs of the Resolution, the third calls fo r judicial action, while the fourth refers
back to the various economic and other means adopted in the previous resolutions.
But their lack of success was painfully manifest in the ruins still smoking thirty
blocks south of Turtle Bay.
On September 28, 2001, the Council revisited the problem in a somewhat calmer
environment. Resolution 1373 (2001), again explicitly invoking Chapter VII, reiterated the pre-9f 11 judicial and economic strategies but added that "all States shall ...
[tlake the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, induding by
provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information."l" By November 14,2001 , Resolution 1378 could refer, if vaguely, to the Council's support
for "international efforts to root out terrorism," l1 but it immediately made dear, as it
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had earlier, that this was to be done "in keeping with the Charter of the United Na·
tions."lll Those words are code for the Charter 's prohibition on the unilateral use of
force in any circumstance other than exigent self-defense. But in this Resolution, the
Council inserted, in its fo urth considerandum, an explicit condemnation of
the Taliban for allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base for the export of terrorism by
the Al-Qaida network and other terrorist groups and fo r providing safe haven to
Usama Bin Laden, Al-Qaida and others associated with them, and in this context [the

Council] support[s] the efforts of the Afghan people to repUu:e the Ta/iban regime.I 9

This was the first mention of an internationally approved regime change in Afghanistan. But it would be more than overstatement to call this an a priori authorization or an authentic UN initiative. By the tim e the Resolution was agreed, US
Special Forces were operating in northern Afghanistan, actively assisting the
Northern Alliance, and they would shortly be in Kabul, where a new government
would be installed. As for the Taliban, they would withdraw from the capital and
the other cities. They were no longer the de facto government of Afghanistan but
were far from defeated as a military force. So the Council was, in effect, only confirming and acceding to (or participating in the fruits of) a fait accompli which had
been accomplished without prior Council authorization.
In Bonn, Germany, a conference, which brought together non -Taliban Afghans
as well as warlords who had form erly been associated with the Taliban, was convened, essentially by the United States. O n December 5, 2001, the conference concluded the Bonn Agreement, which put in place provisional arrangements for a
new government.2(1 Adaylater,on December 6, the Security Council, in Resolution
1383, endorsed the Bonn Agreement, called on all Afghan groups to support the
new government and declared itself willing to support it. 2] On December 20, the
Council, again , accommodated to rather than shaped events. In Resolution 1386,
in effect, it acceded to the Bonn Agreement's request that the Council authorize an
International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF; took note of the United Kingdom's willingness to organize and lead ISAF; and a uthorized ISAF to perform its
mission in Afghanistan for 6 months.22 It has been renewed semiannually.
III

The purpose of this rapid diachronic review of the actions of the Security Council
from the late 1990s to the end of200 1 is not to belittle the contribution ofthe Security Council or of the United Nations to the US response to the attacks by AI Qaeda.
Quite the contrary! I believe that the United Nations is an important institution fo r
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its member States and, when correctly and sensibly used, can be a critical instrument of policy for the United States.23 But the United Nations is not a supple, multipurpose instrument that can be readily applied to all situations. The principles
which the organization and its members value most-in particular national sovereignty, non -intervention and territorial inviolability-and the idiosyncratic structure ofthe Security Council limit the organization's effectiveness in managing and
resolving conflicts with aggressive global Salafism. Or, to for mulate it in more positive terms, the way a military mission is designed may influence whether the Security Council or, more generally, the United Nations will facili tate or constrain it; it
may also determine the degree of that facilitation or obstruction .
Prior to 200 I , the efforts of national actors who were threatened or were victims
of AI Qaeda to work through the United Nations were oflittle effect. The problem
was not that the Council's operational arsenal of diplomatic, economic and ideological instrwnents-which, after 1999, were even taken under its plenary Chapter
VII powers-are inherently ineffective. In some cases, that arsenal has proved effective, either as a primary or adjunct instrument for securing desired political
changes. The anti-Taliban sanctions might have worked over a vel)' long period of
time, especially if some of the governments contiguous to Afghanistan had fully
complied with and implemented them.
The difficulty lies in that time factor. In the twenty-first century, governments,
which anticipate the types of military attacks which actors such as AI Qaeda mount,
cannot always afford the luxury of waiting for a very long period of time for Security Council measures to "bite." The most noxious ofSalafist threats can operate on
a m uch more accelerated timetable and with a greater potential fo r destructive
impacts.
This is, of course, what happened in the case of the Taliban and AI Qaeda. While
the Council fine-tuned and patiently waited for its sanctions program to work, the
Taliban government, amply supplied with illicit drug money and benefitting from
either indifferent or actively sympathetic elements in some contiguous States, reinforced its control over Afghanistan; as fo r AI Qaeda, comfortably cocooned in the
Taliban system, it pursued its various programs, culminating in its operations on
September II .
The Un ited Nations is neither world politics nor even its major arena; it is a
part of it, a composite actor within it. Assessing the effectiveness of the UN role in
this phase of the Afghan war requires us to look at the broader arena of world politics. There, what appears to have happened is that after September 11, the United
States and those States cooperating with it, perforce, took their own initiatives. As
for the other less supportive but indispensable members of the Security Council,
they accommodated themselves to what appeared to be a fait accompli, trading a
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measure of Council author ization, by retrospective stamp o f approval, in return
for the validation of the Council's own relevance and a nominal share o f supervi·
sion. In the coin of international political exchange, that validation was worth
something.
But the Security Council does not control the market on international authority. It may not always deny lawfulness to an action by withholding its seal of approval; conversely, its seal of approval does not always assure that the actions in
question will be viewed as lawfu1 by other politically relevant actors in the international system. This is especially the case when the action involves invading and displacing an existing government-hence the tepid Security Council efforts prior to
9/1 1 and the limited a uthorizations (usually coming after the fact) thereafter.
IV

One of the lessons for the fut ure here appears to be that where urgent action against
entities like AI Qaeda and its affiliates is required, the responses which may, at the
most, be expected from the Security Council-the sorts of measures ordered by the
Council in the period before September I I, 200 I-will not be sufficient in real
time; in these circumstances, unilateral and, by its nature, anticipatory military action may be the only meaningfu1 option. A confirmation of the international lawfulness of such unilateral action by the Security Council and the more diffuse
international processes of decision shou1d be sought. But it is not likely that such
action, even when plausibly construed as a form of self-defense, will be authorized
in advance by the Security Council or confirmed or celebrated after the fact. It appears clear, however, that the more am bitious, extensive and ant i-governmental
the unilateral action undertaken, the less likely will be Security Council or more
general international support.
For the reasons set out in Part I, one of the considerations in the design of a unilateral action which a State feels it m ust take in either reactive or anticipatory selfdefense 24 should be to increase its international legal acceptability and to decrease
perceptions of the violation of international law. I would suggest that this be done
even if addressing these considerations means ultimately that a less efficacious military action will be mounted. Missions which are designed so that they can be accomplished rather quickly, if unlikely to win formal and informal internat ional
approval, are more likely to provoke less, and less intense, international disapproval. By contrast,longer-term missions and, as I will explain in a moment, occupations will require international authorization and even if it does not erode, it
may not be an assurance of success.
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Thus, consideration of the legal perspective I sketched a moment ago leads to a
general recommendation: where possible, narrow the focus of the mission to the
neutralization or degrading of the specific terrorist threat and not to a regime
change of the government which has selVed as the cocoon of the terrorist group.

v
Unquestionably, transforming a regime which is providing refuge and a laun ching
pad for a terrorist group into a regime "enduring freedom" is a more comprehensive solution than simply degrading the capacities of the terrorist group itself. But
aside from the formidable operational difficulties in effecting a regime change,
which I have considered eisewhere,2s planners cannot ignore the intense international political and legal resistance which a military mission of this sort will
provoke.
A military action against a specific noxious target within a State is a fini te and temporally limited military rather than an extended counterinsurgency action; with all
the controversy it may excite (and I will consider it in a moment), it will still be less
internationally controversial than an action to change the entire regime within the
State. 26 If the jurisprudence of the International Court is taken as a reliable indicator of what formal international law currently considers lawful self-defense, the law
of self-defense appears to be limited to response to and neutralization of an immediate threat,21 and even within those narrow parameters, international appraisals
of lawfulness may vary.
Contrast, first, the international legal reactions to the Clinton administration's
periodic aerial actions against Iraqi air defenses with the objective confined to "degrading" them; and, second, the international legal reaction to the US invasion of
Iraq in order to change the regime. Or, to take a rather wild hypothetical scenario,
imagine the contrasting reactions to (1) unilaterailSAF or Afghan military action
against AI Qaeda or Taliban bases in the fro ntier areas of Pakistan and (ii ) unilateral ISAF military action to change the Pakistani government because elements
high in the government or in lSI were believed to be supporting the Taliban or AI
Qaeda.
Afghanistan, I concede, presented a difficult case fo r military planners. In 200 I,
AI Qaeda was effectively integrated in the Ministry of Defense of the Taliban government. But I am not sure that even this overlap required conflating the Taliban
and AI Qaeda or that it precluded the United States from characterizing the adversary as AI Qaeda, reselVing for the Taliban government the status of an obstacle to
reaching the actual enemy, rather than an indistinguishable part of the enemy.
Once AI Qaeda and the Taliban were conflated, however, and Afghan regime
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change became an ineluctable part of the mission, it was no longer possible to con·
centrateefforts on AI Qaeda; significant resources had to be diverted fro m the neu·
tralization of AI Qaeda to creating and shoring up another Afghan government and
then protecting it from the Taliban. In that difficult process, military planners had
to accommodate the full range of civil, political and human rights standards of
contemporary international law, which are demanded with ever greater intensity
through myriad governmental and non-governmental channels. Regime change is
perforce a comprehensive program and brings into the decision process a wide
range of non-governmental organizations, insisting on objectives which, however
worthy, detract from the prosecution ofa more-focused military action; the morefocused military action would bring in far fewer and more-focused demands.
VI

A brief digression: Perhaps a more realistic understanding of how daunting a mission regime change is, especially in Afghanistan, might have led to a more focused
military objective. A contemporary essay on Afghanistan appearing in the most
popular online encyclopedia states:
Once in power, the [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan] moved to pennit
freedom of religion and carried out an ambitious land reform, waiving fanners' debts
countrywide. They also made a number of statements on women's rights and
introduced women to political life. A prominent example was Anahita Ratebzad ...
who wrote the famous New Kabul Times editorial which declared: "Privileges which
women, by right, must have are equal education, job security, health services. and free
time to rear a healthy generation for building the future of the country . . . educating
and enlightening women is now the subject of dose government attention."28

Incidentally, the online essay is not referring to the contemporary government of
President Hamid Karzai but rather to the regime ofTaraki, Amin, and Najibullah
of the PDPA, the government which was then supported by the Soviet Union.
The essay from which I was reading a moment ago continues:
The majority of people in the cities including Kabul either welcomed or were
ambivalent to these policies. However, the secular nature of the government made it
unpopular with religiously conservative Afghans in the villages and the countryside,
who favou red traditionalist "Islamic" restrictions on women's rights and in daily life.29

Does it sound familiar?
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Ronald Neumann, formerly the US ambassador in Kabul, reported that a recent
poll taken in Afghanistan indicated that 55 percent of the respondents wanted the
United States to remain.30 That figure would be decisive in a normal civil situation
where votes decide. But in a belligerent situation, it is raw power that decides. And
ifI may hazard an opinion, I would suggest that the balance of power in Afghanistan tilts in favor of the conservatizing and not the secularizing elements. Moreover, the relevant elite of the critical contiguous State most disposed to invest
resources in trying to influence developments in Afghanistan also appears to tilt toward the conservatizing clements.
The would-be regime changer should bear in mind that, once such a mission is
embarked upon, if military efforts prove indeterminative at acceptable cost levels,
political solutions will have to be sought. In Afghanistan, a political solution would
have to involve the Taliban. At a minimum, it would have to include some role in
power for the Taliban in return for their commitment neither to host nor to support AI Qaeda. This would enable the United States to concentrate its resources on
AI Qaeda. That could have been the principal objective of the mission from the
outset.
I have taxed you with this little excursus from the subject of international law
and expectations of international lawfulness to emphasize that outside powers, if
they are willing to invest very great resources, could be influential factors in the
Afghan political and military drama. But even then, the o utside efforts could well
prove indecisive, for Afghanistan is locked in its own historical process.
VII

I have recommended, from the standpoint of international law, the virtues of a
"less-is-more" approach to the design of missions when international expectations
oflawfulness appear unlikely to support a broader mission. But, in contexts like Afghanistan, is "less" really likely to be more acceptable to the institutions and jurymen of international law? In the context of Afghanistan and its unique
geographical factors, can unilateral actions directed against entities like AI Qaeda,
nesting in another State, ever be lawful? And how can one prospectively assess what
expectations of lawfulness for such an action are likely to be?
I do not intend to crunch the familiar texts on the use of force but rather to focus
on operative expectations of lawfulness. I quote from an online report of the Associated Press (AP) on June 15,2008.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai threatened Sunday to send Afghan troops across the
border to fight militants in Pakistan, a forceful warning to insurgents and the Pakistani
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government that his country is fed up with cross-border attacks. Karzai said that in
recent fighting in Helmand province, where hundreds of US marines have been
battling insurgents for the last two months, most of the fighters came from Pakistan.31
Of interest to US is that President Karzai indicated that he believes that what he is
threatening is a form of lawful self-defense. He stated that "Afghanistan has the
r ight to self-defense, and because militants cross over from Pakistan 'to come and
kill Afghan and kill coalition troops, it exactly gives us the right to do the same."'32
Karzai even threatened targeted assassinations in Pakistan of Baitullah Mehsud,
the Taliban leader in Pakistan, and Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban in Afghanistan and de facto head of State from 1996 to 2001.
Pakistan's reaction to Karzai's statement (and, of course, it is not the first tim e
he has made it) was interesting. YousufRaza Gilani, the Pakistani Prime Minister,
insisted, according to the Associated Press, on Pakistani sovereignty over its territory but said that "the Afghan-Pakistan border is too long to prevent people from
crossing, 'even if Pakistan puts its entire army along the border. "'33 In the meanwhile, he said that Pakistan "is seeking peace deals with militants in its borders, including with Mehsud.".34 This particular Pakistani initiative has concerned the
United States, the AP contin ues, "[b lut Pakistan insists it's not negotiating with
' terrorists,' but rather with militants willing to lay down their arms."35 Baitullah
Mehsud seems to see it differently. H e, the AP adds, "has said he would continue
to send fi ghters to battle US forces in Afghanistan even as he seeks peace with
Pakistan."36
And, one m ight add, he is not puffing. The Associated Press reports that "U.$.
and NATO commanders say that following the peace agreements [between the
Taliban and Pakistan I this spr ing, attacks have risen in the eastern area of Afghanistan along the border. "37
NATO's ISAF declined to comment on Karzai's statement b ut unnam ed US officials were willing to weigh in, on condition of anonymity. I quote their statement:
U.S. officials have increased their warnings in recent weeks that the Afghan conflict will
drag on fo r years unless militant safe havens in Pakistan are taken out. Military officials
say counterinsurgency campaigns are extremely difficult to win when militants have
safe areas where they can train, recruit and stockpile supp1ies.38
No one who has studied counterinsurgency will contest that. The Malayan
Em ergency, which is the poster child of successful counterinsurgencies-and
which, incidentally, required three hundred thousand British and other troops and
twelve years-was conducted in a peninsula whose surrounding waters could be
controlled by the British; there was no contiguous friendly or passive State to
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provide safe redoubts like those available to the Taliban and AI Qaeda in the border
areas of Pakistan. Moreover, the insurgents were racially distinct from the majority
population. And the British public supported the mission.
In August 2007, Senator Sarack Obama said, in a speech delivered in Washington: "If we have actionable intelligence about high-vaJue terrorist targets and President Musharrafwon't act, we will."39 The claim of a right of "hot pursuit," even in
maritime confrontations, is controversial. In the I'm Alot/e arbitration,40 the right
of pursuit was treaty-based and, hence, applied only to US and UK flag vessels.
Moreover, it applied only to pursuit within one hour's sailing time of territorial
waters. So the tribunal's holding, which is not distinguished by its coherence, relates to treaty interpretation rather than a pronouncement of customary internationallaw.
Even more controversial is the claim of a right of hot pursuit across terrestrial
borders. In terms of theory, the UN Charter obviates terrestrial hot pursuit, for the
only unilateral action available to a State is self-defense against an armed attack;
once the adversary has fled the attacked State's territory, the right of self-defense
would exhaust itself. In theory, furthe r prosecuting action that had commenced as
legitimate self-defense might itself degenerate into an armed attack.
International politics and the use of the military instrument as part of it have
proved to be more complicated than the simple theory of the Charter. Instances of
hot pursuit of an adversary which has entered your territory as well as anticipatory
interdiction of an enemy force sheltering in the contiguous territory of another
State have been occurring. While the State whose territory has been invaded has almost always (there are some exceptions) issued a protest, it is harder to conclude
that the internationaJlegal system, as a whole, has unequivocally condemned each
of these pursuits or generally condemned all such actions in all circumstances. To
take examples only from this at/t/us mirabilis, consider (I) the Turkish pursuit of
the Kurdistan Workers' Party in northern Iraq, (ii) the Colombian pursuit of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia in northern Ecuador and (iii) President
Karzai's threat to send Afghan troops into Pakistan in pursuit of Taliban there.
What was the operative judgment as to international lawfulness in these cases?
What sanction was applied, if transgression there was?
Consider the paradigmatic problem of which the war in Afghanistan is a prime
example: irregular non-State forces shelter in an uncontrolled area of State A from
which they regularly conduct lethal raids into State B and then withdraw to the
safety of State A. According to the International Court, the actions of the irregular
forces are not deemed to fulfill the "armed attack" requirement of Article 51 ofthe
Charter. Consequently, even if the Court were to expand its conception of the
scope of self-defense so that it was available against non-State entities, State B may
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not respond with military force. State B is confined to bringing the matter to the
Security Council. Assume that State B does bring the matter to the Security Coun·
cil for ten consecutive attacks and, in each instance, the Security Council issues a
resolution, condemning the attacks and ordering State A to act to prevent them.
The attacks continue.
At a certain point, State B will enter the areas of State A where the irregulars shel·
ter and seek to kill or capture them. Will the international community, through its
various decision processes, condemn and effectively sanction the action?
The international legal system can speak with great subtlety and nuance. In
Corfu CI,annei,41 the International Court of Justice condemned the United Kingdom for having entered Albanian waters without the Albanian government's con·
sent. It held that this condemnation was itself sufficient sanction and allowed the
evidence which had been improperly seized to be admitted. My estimation of the
situation with respect to cross· border pursuit is that there will always be a formal
condemnation because of national pride and concern for the erosion of the principle of territorial integrity but there will only be meaningful and sanction-related
condemnations by the international decision processes in those cases in which the
cross· border action is deemed to have been unnecessary, disproportionate or in
violation of the differentiation principle.
It is, of course, by the application of these criteria that the law of war has tradi·
tionally assessed the lawfulness of actions in new situations. Whether the UN Secu·
rity Council or the International Criminal Court will look at it that way remains to
be seen. But even a condemnation of an internationally unauthorized military ac·
tion in another State which does not affect that State's territory or political inde·
pendence will be less severe than a condemnation for a temporally extended and
vigorously resisted regime cbange.
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